Before you launch a vibe-coded app: data, keys, backups and launch readiness

Data, keys and access: eleven checks

Tick these off before real users put real data in. Each check says how to test it yourself and links the vendor's doc. Limits are as of October 2026. Start with C1 to C3: between them they cover 6 of the 11 cases in the incident table further down (editorial). Our calls (editorial) assume a solo builder using AI coding tools, with no security team, shipping in evenings and weekends.

• C1. RLS is on for every exposed table, and user A cannot see user B's rows. In Supabase, enable Row Level Security on every table in an exposed schema such as public; with RLS on and no policies, the publishable key reads nothing. Add one policy per operation, scoped to authenticated and matching (select auth.uid()) = user_id. A read policy in that pattern: create policy "own rows" on public.todos for select to authenticated using ((select auth.uid()) = user_id);. Insert policies use with check in place of using; update policies combine using (which rows can change) with with check (what the changed row may contain). Views skip RLS unless created with security_invoker = true (Postgres 15+). Run the Security Advisor (Dashboard, or supabase db advisors) and clear the ERROR lints, including 0013_rls_disabled_in_public, 0010_security_definer_view and 0002_auth_users_exposed. Then the two-account test (editorial): sign in as A, try to read, edit and delete B's rows in the app and through the REST endpoint, and repeat signed out.^{[1], [2]}
• C2. Real secrets never reach the browser. The Supabase publishable key (sb_publishable_..., legacy anon) is designed to sit in browser code. The secret key (sb_secret_..., legacy service_role) bypasses every RLS policy and must never be in a browser, app bundle or repo. Next.js inlines every NEXT_PUBLIC_ variable into browser JavaScript, and Vite does the same for VITE_ and says not to put API keys there. Keep backend keys in Lovable Secrets or Vercel Secret variables, both write-only after saving. Check (editorial): in DevTools, search your live site's JavaScript for sb_secret_, sk_, sk-, Bearer and eyJ. A legacy Supabase key is a JWT starting eyJ with its role encoded inside, so a plain-text search for service_role finds nothing. Decode each eyJ token in the DevTools console, never in an online decoder: JSON.parse(atob(TOKEN.split('.')[1].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/'))).role, with the token in quotes in place of TOKEN. It must print anon, never service_role. Keep GitHub push protection on. If a key leaked, fix the leak, create a new key, replace it everywhere, confirm, then retire the old one.^{[3], [59], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]}
• C3. Every read and write is checked on the server. Next.js says Proxy (formerly middleware) is only for optimistic redirects: do real checks in a Data Access Layer and treat every Server Action and Route Handler like a public API endpoint. In Supabase server code, use getClaims(), which verifies the token signature, never getSession(). Supabase's production checklist adds MFA on your Supabase account, CAPTCHA on sign-up, sign-in and password reset, and custom SMTP (the default sender allows 2 auth emails an hour). Logged-out test (editorial): in a private window, open your dashboard and API URLs; each should redirect or return 401 or 403, never data.^{[9], [10], [11]}
• C4. Only a verified webhook marks a user as paid. Verify each Stripe webhook with the Stripe-Signature header, the endpoint's whsec_ secret and the raw request body; Stripe warns that unverified webhooks let attackers fake events that fulfil orders or grant access. Log event IDs to skip duplicates. Never let the browser write a paid or plan column (editorial): in the CVE-2025-48757 write-up, researchers inserted a record with a paid status that bypassed Stripe.^{[12], [13]}
• C5. Every endpoint that costs you money has a cap. OWASP LLM10:2025 calls it Denial of Wallet: someone drives up your pay-per-use bill. Its fixes: rate limits, per-user quotas, input size limits, timeouts, monitoring. As of October 2026, Vercel WAF rate limiting is on every plan, and Hobby gets 1 rule per project with 1,000,000 allowed requests included. OpenAI lets you set a monthly spend limit per organization or project with "Enforce a hard limit" on (requests then get a 429; enforcement is not instant, and alerts alone do not stop traffic). Anthropic lets you set your own spend limit below your tier's cap under Settings > Billing. Our rule of thumb (editorial): sign-in before any paid call, a daily cap per user, a cap on input length, and a hard limit you can afford to lose in a bad week.^{[14], [15], [16], [17]}
• C6. Untrusted text cannot steer your AI feature. OWASP LLM01:2025 says it is unclear whether any method fully prevents prompt injection, so limit the damage: least privilege for the model, privileged actions in your own code, untrusted content marked as such, outputs checked by deterministic code, and a person approving high-risk actions. Never give an LLM feature the Supabase secret key (editorial). Validate every input on the server with a schema library such as Zod.^{[18], [9]}
• C7. Dependencies are patched, and every package is real. Run npm audit and npm audit fix. npm's docs say --force lets audit fix install SemVer-major (breaking) versions, and they recommend not using it unless you know exactly what you want. Turn on Dependabot alerts. Before installing a package your AI tool suggested, check on npmjs.com that it exists and has a real history (editorial). Replit's Package Firewall, on by default, blocks packages Socket has flagged as malicious or compromised, and names slopsquats (package names an AI model invents and an attacker then registers) among the risks it covers. Keep Next.js patched: React2Shell (CVSS 10.0) hit App Router apps on 15.x and 16.x, and Next.js advised rotating secrets after the upgrade.^{[19], [20], [21], [22]}
• C8. AI agents stay away from production data. Replit gives every app separate development and production databases, and its Agent cannot modify production. For the Supabase MCP server, Supabase advises connecting to production only when a task needs it, scoping to one project, read-only mode for unattended work and approving each tool call. Do not run coding agents with permission-skipping flags on a machine holding production keys (editorial). Turn on MFA for GitHub, npm, your host and your database, as CISA urged after the Shai-Hulud npm worm.^{[23], [24], [25]}
• C9. You have restored a backup at least once. Know what your platform keeps (backups by platform below) and test one restore before launch (editorial). Storage files are not in Supabase or Lovable Cloud database backups, so copy them separately.^{[26], [58], [27]}
• C10. You know what personal data you hold, and where it goes. Collect only what the app uses. Find every place your code calls a logger, an analytics or error-tracking SDK, an email service or a model provider, and check what user fields each call sends; strip what the service does not need. Then publish a privacy policy that names those services and matches what you collect (editorial). See privacy basics below.
• C11. Projects, chats and previews are no more public than you meant. On Lovable Free and Pro, projects are visible to the whole workspace and published sites to anyone with the link; only Business and Enterprise can restrict either. A v0 chat set to "Anyone on the web" may be indexed and shown in public galleries. On Vercel, set Deployment Protection to Standard at least, as Vercel advised after its April 2026 incident.^{[28], [29], [30]}

Three audit prompts for your coding agent

Paste these into Cursor, Claude Code, Lovable, Bolt or Replit. Each asks for a report and no changes, so you read the findings before anything is edited. Treat the answer as a first pass: open the files and policies it names and check them yourself (editorial).

List every table and view in the public schema. For each table, say whether RLS is enabled and list every policy with its command, role and condition. For each view, say whether it was created with `security_invoker = true`. Flag any policy that uses `true`, has no `to authenticated`, or lets a user read or change rows where `user_id` is not their own. Do not change anything yet.

Search this codebase for API keys, tokens and secrets. For each one, show the file and say whether that code runs in the browser or on the server. Treat the Supabase publishable or anon key as public and every other key as secret. Flag any secret that is prefixed `NEXT_PUBLIC_` or `VITE_`, read in client-side code, or saved in a file that git does not ignore. Do not change anything yet.

List every API route, Server Action, Route Handler, edge function and database function this app exposes. For each, say whether it can be called while signed out, what it checks before reading or writing data, and whether it confirms the signed-in user owns the row. Flag any that trusts a user ID, role, price or plan sent from the browser, and any check that only runs in the UI or in middleware. Do not change anything yet.

What went wrong in 2025 and 2026

Documented cases from researchers, vendors and the press. Most were exposures that researchers found and reported, not confirmed attacks. The last column points to the check that covers each one.

Sources accessed 2026-10-13. Counts are the researchers' own figures.^{[32], [13], [33], [34], [35], [36], [25], [22], [37], [38], [39], [30]}

What your builder already scans

Each big browser builder now ships some checks. They catch common mistakes and do not replace C1 to C11. The last column is what each vendor says about the limits.

Plans and limits as of October 2026. Checked on vendor pages 2026-10-13.^{[40], [41], [42], [21], [43], [44]}

Backups by platform

What each platform keeps for you as of October 2026. On every platform below, rolling back code and restoring data are separate steps.

Checked on vendor pages 2026-10-13.^{[26], [58], [27], [45], [23], [46]}

Privacy basics (not legal advice)

A short orientation, not legal advice. If your app holds health, financial or children's data, talk to a lawyer before launch (editorial).

• GDPR can apply outside the EU. The European Commission says GDPR covers organisations outside the EU that offer goods or services, paid or free, to people in the EU, or monitor their behaviour.^[55]
• A breach starts a 72-hour clock. Under GDPR, report a breach to the data protection authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, unless it is unlikely to put people at risk, and tell affected people without undue delay when their risk is high.^[56]
• The CCPA has thresholds. California's CCPA applies to for-profit businesses that meet at least one threshold, such as buying, selling or sharing the personal information of 100,000 or more California residents or households. The Attorney General's page lists them all.^[57]
• Know your processors. List every service that touches user data (database, auth, email, analytics, error tracking, model provider) and say in your privacy policy what each receives (editorial).

Ready to post anywhere?

Launch venues turn away a lot of first posts. Check these before launch week; rules as of October 2026. Venue-by-venue detail is on where to launch, and the plan around launch day is in how to launch a product.

• Your own domain. BetaList says a startup must have its own domain and does not accept free hosting subdomains such as vercel.app or netlify.app. SaaSHub rejects free subdomains, waitlist pages and unreleased products. Connect a domain before you submit.^{[47], [48]}
• Accounts with some history. Product Hunt makes new accounts wait 1 week before posting and suggests joining three months or more ahead. Hacker News has temporarily restricted Show HN after a surge of posts from newcomers, and asks them to take part first.^{[49], [51]}
• Something people can try today. Show HN wants a non-trivial project people can try, ideally without a signup, and treats landing pages and sign-up pages as off-topic.^[52]
• A post you wrote yourself. Hacker News asks for no generated text in posts and no generated or AI-edited text in comments. Write the build story by hand: tools, what broke, what you changed (editorial).^[53]
• One venue at a time, inside its cap. Product Hunt allows one launch per product or root domain every six months unless a relaunch request is approved; a new UI or pricing change does not count. r/SaaS moderators limited self-promotion to once per 60 days in April 2026, counting posts, comment plugs and links.^{[50], [54]}
• C1 to C11 done. A launch sends strangers to your app on one day. Finish the data and access checks first.

Common questions

Sources

Each number in brackets on this page points here. Prices and limits change; the date is when we read the page.

1. [1]Supabase docs, Row Level Security · accessed 13 October 2026
2. [2]Supabase docs, Database Advisors (security lints) · accessed 13 October 2026
3. [3]Supabase docs, Understanding API keys · accessed 13 October 2026
4. [4]Next.js docs, Environment variables · accessed 13 October 2026
5. [5]Vite docs, Env variables and modes · accessed 13 October 2026
6. [6]Lovable docs, Secrets · accessed 13 October 2026
7. [7]Vercel docs, Config and Secret environment variables · accessed 13 October 2026
8. [8]GitHub docs, About push protection · accessed 13 October 2026
9. [9]Next.js docs, Authentication · accessed 13 October 2026
10. [10]Supabase docs, Server-side auth for Next.js · accessed 13 October 2026
11. [11]Supabase docs, Production checklist · accessed 13 October 2026
12. [12]Stripe docs, Receive Stripe events in your webhook endpoint · accessed 13 October 2026
13. [13]Matt Palmer, Statement on CVE-2025-48757 · accessed 13 October 2026
14. [14]OWASP GenAI, LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption · accessed 13 October 2026
15. [15]Vercel docs, WAF rate limiting · accessed 13 October 2026
16. [16]OpenAI API docs, Spend limits · accessed 13 October 2026
17. [17]Claude API docs, Rate limits (spend limits section) · accessed 13 October 2026
18. [18]OWASP GenAI, LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection · accessed 13 October 2026
19. [19]npm docs, npm audit · accessed 13 October 2026
20. [20]GitHub docs, About Dependabot alerts · accessed 13 October 2026
21. [21]Replit docs, Package Firewall · accessed 13 October 2026
22. [22]Next.js, Security advisory CVE-2025-66478 (React2Shell), 2025-12-03 · accessed 13 October 2026
23. [23]Replit docs, Development and production databases · accessed 13 October 2026
24. [24]Supabase docs, Model Context Protocol (MCP) · accessed 13 October 2026
25. [25]CISA, Widespread supply chain compromise impacting npm ecosystem, 2025-09-23 · accessed 13 October 2026
26. [26]Supabase docs, Database backups · accessed 13 October 2026
27. [27]Lovable docs, Database (Lovable Cloud backups) · accessed 13 October 2026
28. [28]Lovable docs, Privacy and security settings · accessed 13 October 2026
29. [29]v0 docs (llms.txt), chat sharing options · accessed 13 October 2026
30. [30]Vercel, April 2026 security incident bulletin · accessed 13 October 2026
31. [31]Supabase changelog, Tables not exposed to the Data and GraphQL API automatically · accessed 13 October 2026
32. [32]NVD, CVE-2025-48757 (tagged disputed) · accessed 13 October 2026
33. [33]Wiz Research, Base44 authentication bypass, 2025-07-29 · accessed 13 October 2026
34. [34]The Register, Replit response to the SaaStr database deletion, 2025-07-22 · accessed 13 October 2026
35. [35]General Analysis, Supabase MCP prompt injection demonstration, 2025-07-08 · accessed 13 October 2026
36. [36]RedHunt Labs, Secrets leaking through vibe-coded sites, 2025-09-23 · accessed 13 October 2026
37. [37]Wiz Research, Exposed Moltbook database, 2026-02-02 · accessed 13 October 2026
38. [38]The Register, Lovable-built exam app exposed user records, 2026-02-27 · accessed 13 October 2026
39. [39]The Register, Lovable and project data on public projects, 2026-04-20 · accessed 13 October 2026
40. [40]Lovable docs, Security overview · accessed 13 October 2026
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44. [44]Vercel blog, v0 and vibe coding securely, 2025-08-04 · accessed 13 October 2026
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46. [46]Bolt support, Rollback and backup · accessed 13 October 2026
47. [47]BetaList, FAQ · accessed 13 October 2026
48. [48]SaaSHub, Submit your product (rules) · accessed 13 October 2026
49. [49]Product Hunt, Before launch · accessed 13 October 2026
50. [50]Product Hunt help, Can I relaunch my product? (updated 2026-07-07) · accessed 13 October 2026
51. [51]Hacker News, Show HN restriction notice · accessed 13 October 2026
52. [52]Hacker News, Show HN guidelines · accessed 13 October 2026
53. [53]Hacker News, Guidelines · accessed 13 October 2026
54. [54]r/SaaS moderators, New rule against self-promo, 2026-04-14 · accessed 13 October 2026
55. [55]European Commission, Data protection explained · accessed 13 October 2026
56. [56]EDPB, Data protection guide for small business: data breaches · accessed 13 October 2026
57. [57]California Attorney General, California Consumer Privacy Act (updated 2026-08-28) · accessed 13 October 2026
58. [58]Supabase, Pricing (plan comparison: Automatic backups) · accessed 13 October 2026
59. [59]Supabase docs, JWT Claims Reference (anon and service role token examples) · accessed 13 October 2026

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